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A Review of Prisoners' Rights Under
the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments
I.

INTRODUCTION

That it is constitutionally permissible for a state to imprison those
convicted of a criminal offense, or those charged but not convicted who
are detained awaiting trial, is not disputed. Problems, however, do
arise when the Supreme Court must assess the extent of the constitutional rights retained by incarcerated individuals.' Acutely aware of
the competing interests-the state's duty to protect its citizens from
criminal offenders and each individual's right to the constitutional
guarantees-the Supreme Court has found it necessary to differentiate
between the rights afforded to the "free" citizen and those retained by
the inmate. Although confinement necessarily restricts many of the
rights and privileges enjoyed by ordinary citizens, the Court has
stated that "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime." 2 Nevertheless, the prisoner's
constitutional rights have been seriously redefined by the Supreme
Court to accommodate the exigencies of prison life.'
When prisoners' rights are in issue, special governmental concerns
have been recognized as permitting the Court to vary the traditional
tests for constitutional rights. For example, maintenance of order and
discipline are major, if not vital, interests of prison administrators, and
goals of rehabilitation and securing prisons against escape are additional problems unique to the prison setting.' In striking a balance between the governmental interests and the individual's rights, the
Supreme Court has applied the principle that "there must be mutual
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution. '5 This comment proposes to survey the
results of that "mutual accommodation" in the areas of first, fifth, and
eighth amendment rights by reviewing several important opinions of
1. Cases in this area have generally been placed in the category of "prisoners' rights
decisions," with an emphasis on convicted prisoners. For the purposes of this comment,
however, the term "prisoner" will include the pretrial detainee-those prisoners who are
detained pending trial-as well as the convicted inmate.
2. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
3. For a good discussion of the constitutional rights retained by prisoners in a work
directed to prisoners, see A JailhouseLawyer's Manual, 9 & 10 COLuM. HUMAN RIGHTS L.
REV. 1 (1977-78).
4. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539-40 (1979).
5. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
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the Supreme Court, and outlining the scope of these constitutional
guarantees retained throughout incarceration as interpreted by the
lower federal courts.
Although the first amendment has long been regarded as one of the
most safeguarded of rights, it has often had to yield to governmental
interests in the prison context; accordingly, the scope of its reach has
been severely redefined for those in prison.' On the other hand, the
due process clause, which assures protection from arbitrary governmental action,' has more significance for the incarcerated individual,
and has been given special attention by the Court. Despite the judicial
deference shown to prison officials, the Court, in consistently protecting the inmate's legitimate liberty and property interests, has provided
a limited check on the actions of such officials. Access to courts, a right
which also flows from the fifth amendment, is another constitutional
mandate of great importance to one confined in jail. Whether the purpose for seeking access to the court is to assert a claim for release or a
challenge to prison regulations or conditions, the ability to make such
a claim is a fundamental guarantee that cannot be infringed to any
large extent. The eighth amendment's restriction on cruel and unusual
punishment has been utilized to allow review of conditions of confinement within prisons. However, the high standard employed to find an
eighth amendment violation may preclude effective redress for valid
challenges that are not yet severe enough to constitute an offense to
"human dignity." In appraising and analyzing the scope and extent of
the "rights of inmates" in light of the above-stated constitutional considerations, this comment seeks to define the present position of both
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
II.

THE PRISONER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In the years preceeding the 1960's, the Supreme Court perceived
the constitutional rights of prisoners as being beyond the scope of
judicial review, and applied a "hands-off" doctrine that barred any consideration of prisoners' complaints.' It was in the first amendment area
6. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (declining to extend the fourth amendment
right of privacy to the prison context). In Wolfish, periodic unannounced room searches
and body cavity searches were found not to constitute an unreasonable search or seizure
or to violate any privacy rights of a prisoner. Id. at 558-60.
7. Likewise, the eighth amendment's proscription against "cruel and unusual punishment" is a vital "right" retained by one incarcerated. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678 (1978) (Supreme Court found that certain conditions of confinement in punitive isolation cells constituted an unconstitutional form of punishment under eighth amendment
standards).
8. Calhoun, The Supreme Court and The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A
Reappraisal,4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 220-21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Calhoun].
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that the Supreme Court initially decided to abandon this approach,
which prevented constitutional review of prison administrative decisions. Although the change in attitude did not indicate that deference
to officials in the administration of prison affairs was to be substantially
changed or impaired,9 it was the first recognition by the Court that
valid constitutional claims, even for those incarcerated, must be enforced
by the judiciary.
It is also in the first amendment area that the wide divergence in
constitutional standards is best illustrated, for the reach of the first
amendment in the area of prisoners' rights does not even closely compare with the corresponding first amendment rights enjoyed by the
majority of the population who comprise "free society." This disparity
in regard to the first amendment freedoms at first appears shocking,
since society generally holds the freedoms of speech, press and religion
as three of the most valuable rights insured by the Constitution. But
upon reflection, when the dissimilar cultural needs of the prisoner and
the "free citizen" are compared, the difference is revealed to be less
"chilling" than it first seems."0 Prison discipline requires a silencing of
speech that may portend rioting or disorder; it must be conceded that
inflammatory speech in prison invites a greater chance of "revolution"
than does the same rhetoric outside the confines of a prison cell. The
recognition of these realities has mandated the Court's obliqueness in
the area.
Two early decisions, Cooper v. Pate" and Cruz v. Beto, 2 involved
combined freedom of religion and equal protection challenges by inmates. By holding that these complaints stated a cause of action
against dismissal, the Court prohibited special treatment by prison officials for certain religious groups and a denial of that same treatment
for others." These decisions have also been cited by the Court for the
general proposition that prisoners retain first amendment rights during incarceration."
Likewise, censorship of direct personal correspondence was found to
be unconstitutional, as restricting the first amendment rights of free
speech of both prisoners and their correspondents. In Procunier v.
9. Id. at 222-23. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
10. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963), for decisions in which statutes with a "chilling" effect on speech were held to
be invalid.
11. 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
12. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
13. For a discussion of the equal protection emphasis of these first amendment
claims, see Calhoun, supra note 8, at 237-42.
14. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 422 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Martinez,5 under these dual interests, the Court held that censorship
of prison mail is only permissible if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. In reaching that conclusion, the Court cautioned that the
limitation of first amendment freedoms can be no greater than is
necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved."6 Of course, it is clear that this standard is far below
the exacting scrutiny traditionally required under a first amendment
analysis. This reflects the latitude the Court feels must be reserved in
administrators to secure their institutions. The Court did emphasize
that a distinction in this regard must be made between valid goals of
the prison system, and a mere desire to subdue complaints or
criticisms by inmates of institutional policies, rules or officials. The latter prevention of inmate grievances will violate the first amendment
under Martinez.
However, when faced with the issue of first amendment access by
the press to prisons and prisoner, the Supreme Court, in Pell v. Procunier 7 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,"8 framed the constitutional
test in terms of the prison inmate's retaining those first amendment
rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. 9 This
language not only restates the balance of interests utilized by the
Court in the past, but its tenor also appears to be more restrictive in
depicting those interests possessed by inmates. Under the standard
outlined in Pell and Saxbe, a prison regulation prohibiting inmate
participation in face-to-face communication with the news media was
held constitutionally allowable."0 Even more recently, the press was
determined to have no right of access to jails beyond that of ordinary
citizens. Although the media's role to provide information to the public
regarding conditions of confinement is thereby affected, the restriction
was justified by the goals which would prevent disruption of jail operations.2
15. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
16. Id at 413.
17. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
18. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
19. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822.
20. Id. at 827-28. This situation was likened to a time, place, and manner regulation
which permits a reasonable restriction on communicative activity where significant
government interests exist. Id at 826. Further, security considerations and related administrative problems permit officials wide latitude so long as "reasonable and effective
means of communication" remain open and no content discrimination exists. Id
21. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). Houchins, however, was an action
brought by the news media. Therefore, although the decision affects those in prison, it is
not really a "prisoners' rights" case.
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Finally, a prison regulation which prohibited prisoners soliciting
fellow inmates to join a self-denominated organizational "union," was
found to be a valid limitation of first amendment rights. In Jones v.
North CarolinaPrisoners'Labor Union, Inc.,' the Court reasoned that
the ban on inmate solicitation and group meetings was rationally
related to the reasonable, indeed to the central, objective of prison administration." Freedom of speech rights must give way to penal goals,
where the potential for disruption is inherent in the discussions
espoused. In addition, although the Court found associational rights
more implicated by the ban than those of free speech, it nonetheless
held that the constitutional guarantees do not outweigh the reasonable
considerations involved in management of the prison. The Jones decision defined the scope of associational rights which belong to inmates,
when the Court noted that not only are they curtailed by confinement
in relation to union activity, but that officials, in their discretion, may
so act whenever group meetings or activities possess the likelihood of
disruption to prison order and stability, or otherwise interfere with
the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment.2'
The leeway granted to prison authorities in the "free speech" area
is quite extensive, since it appears that the Court is willing to defer to
officials upon a showing of any valid penal interest. Similarly, controls
permitted on media access certainly inhibit the permissible extent of
discussion of conditions or confinement. The only effective, basically
unrestricted means to voice prisoner grievances under the first amendment, then, are through correspondence, as well as during the limited
visitation periods. Although the harshness of this consequence appears
to conflict with the basic concepts underlying the constitutional
guarantees, the justifications articulated by the Court cannot be lightly
discounted. Group meetings or discussions with the media accent the
plight of confinement and may well result in uprisings in protestation;
preventing these occurrances is a necessity if effective control in the
penal institution is to be maintained. But too strict a maintenance program can result in the needless silencing of valid speech, and prison
authorities can become the "final word" as to what may be said. The
check mechanism has not been placed with the courts in this instance,
but has been left inside the prison. Additionally, the possibility of un22. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
23. Id. at 129.
24. Id. at 129-30. A prohibition against bulk mailing for the Union was upheld as a
reasonable limitation, since other avenues of communication remained open, and according
to the Court's reasoning, the ban only barely affected free speech values. Id. Likewise,
the no-solicitation rule was found to be not only reasonable, but necessary, due to the fact
that officials were otherwise entitled to control organized union activity and legitimately
to prohibit it. Id. at 131-32.
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needed restraint of religious freedom is also left within the purview of
the prison administration, even though it does not necessarily pose the
same problems as does unrestricted speech. In affording prison officials such wide latitude and deference, the Supreme Court has effectively denied prisoners judicial review of valid first amendment claims;
indirectly, the Court has possibly limited the more valued right of access to the courts, for even if an inmate can have access to court he
still must have a right to assert when he gets there.
III.

THE PRISONER AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Absent a more specific guarantee of the Constitution as a basis for
asserted rights of prisoners, the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments has often been utilized by the Supreme
Court." The rationale may well be that procedural due process protections and access to the courts are among those "rights" which may
have inherently greater significance for those behind prison walls. Certainly, provisions for safeguards from arbitrary governmental action
during custodial proceedings are all the more important when no other
outlet is available for protestations. These concerns are weighed by
the Court against administrative convenience and safety problems on
the part of government officials. The resulting deference to officials in
this context is tempered by the extent of possible loss of liberty which
may be occasioned by the procedure involved.
A. ProceduralDue Process
Certain minimum procedures have always been mandated by the
Constitution as a requirement to be followed before any deprivation of
life, liberty or property interests.26 When dealing in the prison setting,
however, this procedure is one step removed, as the individual involved
has already been denied liberty rights through procedures leading up
to his valid incarceration. Therefore, considerations as to procedures
required in the confines of prison are approached on a different level.
For example, in Wolff v. McDonnell,' the Court extended procedural
constitutional protections to convicted prisoners during disciplinary
25.

See Calhoun, supra note 8, at 227. See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530-32

(1979), where the court disagreed with the lower court's reliance on the "presumption of

innocence" standard as the source of pretrial detainee's substantive rights regarding conditions of confinement. In Wolfish, the Court employed an analysis based upon deprivation of detainee's liberty without due process of law as required by the fifth amendment.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. states in relevant part: "No person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
27. 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
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proceedings, 8 based upon a liberty interest enjoyed by the prisoners
under the fourteenth amendment. 9 In this situation, minimum procedures required for an inmate facing disciplinary action include advance written notice of the alleged violation, as well as a written statement by fact finders as to evidence relied upon and reasons for which
the action was taken."0 Moreover, the inmate must also be allowed time
to prepare a defense after notification of the charges. The inmate can
also call witnesses and present evidence at his hearing, so long as it is
not "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals."'"
Of course, this last determination is left to the discretion of prison officials, with the suggestion by the Court that a reason for denial be
furnished.2
Loss of "good time" credits or confinement in a disciplinary cell can
be the result of a finding of flagrant or serious misconduct. These
alterations in the term and/or conditions of confinement are "liberty"
interests which sufficiently justify recognition of certain minimum
guidelines. These considerations most likely weighed heavily in the
balance in Wolff, although the Court did concede that the full range of
procedural protections were not available in the prison setting. The
needs of the institution, for example, prevented a decision that inmates
have a right to retained or appointed counsel for disciplinary proceedings.'
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its denial of a right to counsel in
28. Id at 563. Prior to Wolff, similar procedural protections had been afforded to
parolees, in the form of an impartial preliminary hearing, before parole could be revoked.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Correspondingly, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973), the minimum due process requirements of Morrissey, as well as the
limited right to counsel, were held applicable to probation revocation proceedings.
29. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556-57. The interest involved in Wolff was a
state-created right to good-time credit for unsatisfactory behavior while in prison. The
sanction for major misconduct was a forfeiture of credits accumulated.
30. Id at 563.
31. Id at 566.
32. Id.at 566-67. In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court later emphasized that its suggestion that prison officials set forth the reason for denying a
prisoner's right to call witnesses was only a suggestion, and did not rise to the level of a
due process requirement. Id at 321.
33. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 557. Cf. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976),
where the Court found no liberty interest on the issuance of an unexecuted parole violation warrant against an inmate even though it may affect his parole eligibility and prison
classification status. Id.at 85. The Court found no due process right to a hearing, since
the prospect of future incarceration due to the warrant is uncertain, and further, because
any conviction certainly would constitute a parole violation. Id. at 87-89.
34. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 569-70. The rationale for disallowing counsel in
disciplinary hearings is to prevent an adversary cost, which could reduce the correctional
goal utility of the hearing process. Id
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disciplinary proceedings in Baxter v. Palmigiano,5 even though the
charges involved conduct which was punishable as a crime under state
law, and not merely loss of good time credits, as was involved in Wolff.
The Court rationalized that since these hearings are not criminal proceedings, the introduction of an "adversarial cast" would unnecessarily
impede institutional goals." The minimum due process procedures mandated by Wolff were not extended by Baxter in any other regard as
well. The interest of the inmate recognized by the Court apparently
only covers a "basic" right for those fundamentally essential procedures which are necessary to prevent abuse of discretion by officials.
For example, due process does not prohibit an adverse inference from
being drawn by an inmate's silence at his hearing. 7 The only exception
made concerns evidence which may be used to incriminate the inmate
in future criminal proceedings. 8 Further, the limited right to call
witnesses and present evidence permitted by Wolff was narrowed by
the Court, as confrontation and cross-examination were found not to be
included in due process rights for disciplinary hearings. 9
Although Wolff and Baxter delineated procedures necessary for a
disciplinary hearing, the Supreme Court held that no hearing is required before a prisoner is transferred from one prison to another.
Meachum v. Fano' ° involved a transfer to a prison where the conditions
of confinement were substantially less favorable to the prisoner. A
fact-finding hearing was not found to be required by the due process
clause, since no "liberty" interest was infringed by transfers between
institutions.' After his conviction, a prisoner may constitutionally be
35. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
36. Id at 315. The inmate in Baxter was charged with inciting a disturbance and
disruption, which may have caused a riot. These charges could result in serious discipline,
such as prolonged isolation. Id. at 312-13.
37. Id at 320. Due process, rather than the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination, was used as the basis for the Court's consideration. Id at 319. This is
because disciplinary proceedings are not considered criminal actions, since the correctional process and other state interests involve more than a desire to convict the charged
inmate. Id. at 318-19.
38. Id. at 316. This again supports the proposition that procedural guarantees are
greater in the prison-hearing situation when the consequence may be an increase in the
duration of confinement.
39. Id at 321-22. See also note 31 and accompanying text supra.
40. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). The correctional institution involved was a state facility, and
thus, the transfer at issue was intrastate.
41. Id. at 224-25. The Court recognized that the transfer between institutions may
result in a "grievous loss" to the prisoner due to differences in conditions of confinement.
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the discretionary reasons that may occasion a
transfer need not be justified by officials before transfer, since the transfer does not interfere with the duration, but only conditions of confinement, and thus no liberty interest
is involved. Id. at 226-29.
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deprived of his liberty and confined by the state in its prison system in
any of its prisons. In a companion case, Montanye v. Haymes,'2 the
Court likewise found no due process right to a hearing before transfer,
even if the transfer resulted from disciplinary or punitive action by
prison officials. Deference to prison authorities was not abandoned or
restricted in favor of any interest claimed by inmates in this context.
Although the resulting change in conditions of confinement due to the
transfer may in fact be a "grievous loss" to the inmate, his interest
still does not merit due process considerations, according to the Court.
This reasoning is based upon the foreseeable burden which may be imposed upon the system, where transfers occur for a variety of administrative reasons. To require a hearing and justification for transfer
was beyond what the Court felt was required in a situation where the
fact of imprisonment remained the same, even though living accommodations may have been substantially affected.'3 Obviously, the "comfort" aspect or interest claimed to be infringed by the inmates is not a
condition of confinement in which the Court places great concern. In
fact, the Supreme Court did not seem concerned that threats of such
damages may be employed by officials as a coercive tactic.
The transfer from a penal institution to a mental hospital was
recently held to be a sufficient loss of liberty so as to require procedural due process protections. In Vitek v. Jones," the Supreme
Court distinguished Meachum and Montanye, finding that while a conviction and imprisonment may extinguish the inmate's freedom from
confinement, this does not extend to an ability by the state to classify
the individual as mentally ill."5 Thus, although the state can confine an
inmate in any of its prisons, when the transfer extends beyond the
bounds of the penal system, such as to a mental hospital, the transfer
requires the protections of the due process clause. The liberty interest
identified by the Court in Vitek was not merely a state-created right,"
42. 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). The inmate in Montanye alleged that his transfer was in
retaliation for rendering legal assistance to fellow inmates, and seeking to petition the
court for redress for grievances. Id. at 239. If true, these actions are constitutionally protected under the due process clause's protection of the rights of access to the courts. See
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
43. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976).
44. 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980).
45. Md at 1264.
46. MLat 1261. Nebraska law provides for the transfer of a prisoner confined in any
state penal institution when a designated physician or psychologist determines that he is
mentally ill and cannot be properly treated in the penal facility. NEs. REV. STAT. §
83-180(1) (1976). Further, upon expiration of the inmate's sentence, civil proceedings may
be commenced if additional detainment is felt to be necessary. Id. § 180(3).
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but emanated from constitutional due process grounds.'7 The right to a
hearing after notice of the contemplated transfer, as well as a limited
right to call witnesses, to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and to have the benefit of an independent decisionmaker,
were held to be minimum procedural requirements in such a
situation.' 8
The due process clause was utilized more recently by the Supreme
Court, to define the rights of pretrial detainees during their confinement prior to trial. 9 A pretrial detainee is that person charged with a
crime and incarcerated, but not convicted. This distinction requires a
different emphasis in discerning the scope of "rights" retained during
confinement. For a detainee, the due process clause guarantees that he
may not be punished when subjected to the restrictions and conditions
of the facility.5' But noting that the corresponding governmental interests involved with a detainee are not significantly different from
those present when dealing with a convicted inmate, the Court concluded that methods used to maintain order and discipline are no less
necessary for the inmate not yet adjudged guilty. With these factors in
mind, the Court in Bell v. Wolfish considered the challenged conditions
of confinement under the standard of the right to be free from punishment. " In this context, the distinction was made between prohibited
punitive measures and permissible regulatory restraints. The Court
enunciated a test which requires, absent a showing of intent to punish,
a showing that the condition or restriction of confinement is not
reasonably related to a legitimate government objective, but appears
excessive. 2 In the Court's view, the challenged practice of "doublebunking" - placing more than one inmate in a cell designed for
one-did not constitute punishment under this test, and thus, did not
violate due process. The legitimate interests in maintaining security
and order, as well as the additional interest in ensuring the detainee's
47. 100 S. Ct. at 1263-64.
48. Id at 1264. However, the state is not required to furnish counsel for inmates if
they are not financially able to provide their own. Id at 1263-64.
49. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See also note 5 supra.
50. 441 U.S at 535 n.16. After conviction, the appropriate standard to measure the
challenged conditions of confinement is the eighth amendment, which permits punishment,
but proscribes "cruel and unusual" punishment. Id See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978).
51. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535-36. Inmates at a state correctional center, who
consisted mainly of pretrial detainees, challenged certain practices and restrictions
employed at the facility. "Double-bunking," as well as prohibitions against receipt of
packages, unannounced room searches and body cavity searches, were among the conditions of confinement challenged. Id. at 527.

52. Id. at 538-40.

1980

Prisoners' Rights

presence at trial, are among the justifications for the restraint imposed, which will not ordinarily constitute punishment.' It appears
that as with convicted prisoners, "comforts" during the period of incarceration are not a major consideration of the Supreme Court in
regard to conditions of confinement and rights of prisoners.
Procedural due process appears to be applied according to the extent of the deprivation which may occur. That is, whenever the
possibility that the duration of confinement may be increased during
the hearing or procedure, the Court is more willing to attach greater
procedural protections. But the scope of these safeguards is reduced,
and deference to officials increased, whenever the procedure involves
less drastic consequences. Of course, since the liberty interest has a
different meaning when dealing with one already deprived of certain
liberty, the Court does not deem it necessary in either instance to accord the full procedural protections which are immediately provided
the free citizen.
B. Access To The Courts
The inmate's right of access to the courts, derived from the due process clause, is probably the most "protected" of all the constitutional
guarantees by the Supreme Court. The Court recognized early the
necessity of unimpaired access to courts, when it ensured to prisoners
the ability to file habeas corpus petitions." More recently, this right
was extended by the Court to include the right to file complaints concerning violations of constitutional rights.' Also, the right of inmates
to seek judicial redress for their grievances encompasses far more
than merely allowing an inmate to file a complaint in the proper court
of law. Realistically, without professional representation or other
aspects that involve access to the courts, such a guarantee may have
little meaning.
For example, in Johnson v. Avery,' the Supreme Court struck down
a prison regulation which prohibited "jailhouse lawyers" from assisting
fellow inmates and held that inmates must be permitted to assist other
prisoners in the preparation of claims for post-conviction relief.
Recognizing that there is generally no obligation to furnish counsel until a petition for post-conviction relief evidences that viable issues are
53. I& at 540. The Court noted that an "arbitrary or
by prison officials would support interference by federal
54. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
55. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Wolff
rights must accompany a prison disciplinary hearing. See
ing text supra.
56. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).

purposeless" restriction imposed
courts in this regard. Id. at 539.
held that minimum due process
also notes 27-28 and accompany-
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presented, the Court noted that the inmate must initially make such a
showing absent legal assistance.5 The otherwise valid considerations
underlying such a restriction promulgated by government authorities,
however, must give way in the absence of some reasonable alternative
provided by the state to assure access to the courts.58
Likewise, the Court held in Procunier v. Martinez59 that a ban
against the use of law students and other paraprofessionals "unjustifiabily obstruct[s]" representation and other aspects of access,
thereby violating due process guarantees. 0 Moreover, in Bounds v.
Smith,"' the Court used "meaningful access" to the courts as the
"touchstone" in defining the right of access, and noted that the state
had an affirmative obligation to guarantee such access.2 To insure the
fundamental constitutional right of access, the Court in Bounds "require[d] prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law."6 5
The Court has not gone so far as to guarantee assistance of
jailhouse lawyers or law libraries as a basic element of the right of access, so as to mandate that these forms of assistance are always required. Rather, these "rights" are permitted only to the extent that
meaningful alternatives are not available or provided. However, the
Court has obviously recognized the importance of guaranteeing
unhampered means for incarcerated individuals to vent their claims,
whatever the grounds. This recognition probably encompasses the
most valuable "right" retained while in prison, and best reflects the
differing emphasis required when assessing the constitutional rights of
prisoners.

IV. THE PRISONER AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment" 4 as applied to the context of the prison has been the least
57. 1& at 487.
58. Id. at 490. The Court pointed out several alternative programs utilized in some
states, such as public defenders or law students assisting inmates, which would conceivably meet the "reasonable alternative" requirement, thereby permitting a valid bar on
"jailhouse lawyers." Id. at 489-90.
59. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).
60. Id. at 419.
61. 430 U.S. at 817 (1977).
62. Id. at 823.
63. Id. at 828. See also Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
64. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
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developed by the Supreme Court, but is the constitutional area most
ripe for judicial pronouncement. The eighth amendment has been the
vehicle by which inmates challenge the conditions of confinement to
which they are subject.
A failure to provide medical care within a prison was the basis, in
Estelle v. Gamble, 5 for the Court to proscribe as unconstitutional certain conditions of confinement. 6 Relying upon the obligation of the
government to provide medical care for an incarcerated individual,
who is otherwise unable to provide care for himself, the Court
evaluated the measures challenged. 7 The pain and suffering which may
result from a denial of medical care were found to have no legitimate
penological purpose, and to be "inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency."" This eighth amendment standard was utilized by
the Gamble Court to preclude "deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners," either by prison doctors or guards. 9
Although the Court extended the eighth amendment guarantees to
the prison medical setting, the test employed does not reach the inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care. 70 That the Gamble
court did not apply the usual administrative deference language in the
eighth amendment context does not signal a broader intervention
power in the federal courts when dealing with medical complaints.
Rather, the combination of the "deliberate indifference" test with the
eighth amendment's contemporary standards of human decency serve
to pose a similar barrier in stating a claim for relief.
The Supreme Court more closely addressed actual conditions within
the penal setting in Hutto v. Finney,71 in its consideration of confinement in punitive isolation. There, the Court noted that confinement in
prison is a form of punishment subject to eighth amendment scrutiny.7 ,
The duration of the confinement in isolation cells, as well as the condi65. 429 U.S. 102 (1976).
66. Punishments deemed to be grossly excessive for the crime involved have been
treated by the Court under the eighth amendment, at least in the context of cases involving the death penalty. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Cf. Rummel v. Estelle,
100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980) (upheld mandatory life sentence imposed under Texas recidivist
statute in case in which the defendant had been convicted of three relatively minor felony
offenses).
67. 429 U.S. at 103-04.
68. Id. at 103.
69. Id. at 104-05.
70. Id-at 106-07. For a discussion of the application of the Gamble "deliberate indifference" standard, see Comment, The Difficulty in Defining Constitutional Standardsfor
State Prisoners' Claims of Inadequate Medical Treatment, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 687 (1979).
71. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
72. Id. at 685.
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tions" which existed, were found to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment by the Court. Prisoners have used the eighth amendment
to challenge a variety of conditions of confinement,"' but the Supreme
Court has generally declined to directly consider these claims. 5
However, the Court did address such a claim by pretrial detainees in
Bell v. Wolfish."' As previously discussed, the Supreme Court made a
distinction between detainees and convicted inmates as to the constitutional standard to be applied." That is, detainees retain the right to be
free from punishment under the due process clause, while convicted inmates are only accorded the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment." However, the Wolfish opinion can provide some guidance
as to conditions which will not be held unconstitutional, since the standard for detainees in this area is higher than for an inmate who has
been adjudged guilty. Thus, if the Supreme Court has delineated certain conditions as not constituting punishment, an inmate is thereby
precluded from claiming that this same condition is cruel and unusual
as applied to him.
7 9
In addition to the challenge to "double-bunking," detainees in
Wolfish argued that certain other administrative practices constituted
"punishment" in violation of their due process rights.' The Court
disposed of the due process claim"1 in brief fashion, holding that practices such as body cavity searches and a ban on receipt of packages
were not unconstitutional. 2 The Court further noted that for both
pretrial detainees and convicted inmates, there must be a showing of
exaggerated response to security considerations for such practices to
be found infirm." As the Court itself acknowledged, this is a heavy
burden that must be met before a claim can be heard in the future.
73. The conditions within isolation cells were found to include a diet of "gruel"; overcrowded and dirty cells; violence and vandalism; and a "lack of professionalism" by security personnel. Id. at 687.
74. For a collection of cases dealing with eighth amendment challenges to prison conditions, see Annot., 51 A.L.R. 3d 111 (1973).
75. In Burrell v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471 (1976), the Court reconsidered and dismissed
its grant of certiorari in a case involving a claim that prison conditions were unconstitutional.
76. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
77. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
78. 441 U.S. 535 n.16.
79. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
80. 441 U.S. at 560. Specifically, the prisoners alleged that improper searches and
restrictions on the purchase and receipt of personal items and books, among other things,
were constitutionally impermissible. Id at 527.
81. The challenged conditions of confinement were also considered and found to be
constitutional under the first and fourth amendments. Id. at 544-60.
82. Id. at 560.
83. Id. at 560-62.
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Although Wolfish appears to have limited the utility of the eighth
amendment in regard to conditions of confinement, the continued
prevalence of claims in this area suggests that the Supreme Court
must eventually consider some of these other conditions to which
prisons are subject. Maintenance of order and discipline, and administrative deference cannot be said to justify a myriad of other conditions which exist within prisons. Many of these other conditions have
already been considered by the lower federal courts when adjudicating
constitutional claims in the context of the prison setting.

V. THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
AS APPLIED IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

The pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the area of prisoners'
rights have been definitive insofar as they limit the remedial power of
the federal courts to redress constitutional claims of inmates.
However, because the Court has not foreclosed all review of constitutional grievances, the ultimate determination of whether to intervene
primarily lies within the discretion of the lower courts. The scope of
this discretion has of course been varied, but it does reveal that the
courts are willing to protect inmates from arbitrary and unreasonable
actions by prison administrators. This section of the comment will
specifically review the issue of prisoners' rights as handled by the
federal courts of appeals.
For example, a regulation banning any form of communication between prisoners confined in prison segregation units was found to be
impermissible on first amendment grounds in Rudolph v. Locke." The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the Pell test to require
the state to show how such a sweeping regulation can limit the ability
to send and receive literature between inmates on the basis of
legitimate penological objectives." The fact that segregation was
voluntary was found to be an insufficient justification; instead, specific
evidence of the necessity of the regulation for inmate safety must be
demonstrated before this ban can withstand constitutional scrutiny."
84. 594 F.2d 1076, 1077 (3d Cir. 1977). For decisions holding mail censorship to be constitutionally infirm, see Crowe v. Leeke, 550 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1977), and Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1972).
85. 594 F.2d at 1077.
86. 1& at 1078. The court further noted that segregation is a necessary part of the
state's obligation to protect prisoners, and therefore, inmates in segregation cannot be
forced to choose between relinquishing constitutional rights or jeopardizing safety. I&
The concept of prisoner protection by the government was similarly discussed by the
Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
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Likewise, the Court of Appeals for The Seventh Circuit, in French v.
Heyne 7 found a first amendment basis which would permit inmate
solicitation of funds for educational and rehabilitation programs.8
Freedom of speech rights retained by inmates require that prison officials meet the Martinez standards before such a prohibition can be
justified. 9
On the other hand, in Pittman v. Hutto, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit found censorship of an inmate magazine to be
reasonable in light of prison officials' belief that publication of the
disputed issue was potentially disruptive of prison order or stability. 1
Deference to the decision of the prison board was similarly accorded
by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Carpenter v. South
Dakota,' a case which involved a ban on receipt by prisoners of mail
containing sexually explicit material. The court of appeals first noted
that if the materials were not obscene, nonprisoners clearly would
have a first amendment right to receive these publications."' However,
even though the court found that officials have the burden of
establishing that the censorship is warranted, it then deferred to the
board's conclusion of detriment to rehabilitation, and sustained the
regulation."'
87. 547 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1976).
88. ld. at 1001. See also Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd
in part on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (court found that
the lack of a rehabilitation program was not "cruel and unusual punishment," but affirmed
lower court's order requiring provision of reasonable recreational facilities).
89. 547 F.2d at 1002. See also notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra. Although the
Supreme Court did find a first amendment freedom of speech right in Martinez, it later
redefined the scope of that right in Jones, 433 U.S. 119, holding that solicitation rights
under the first amendment were limited. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
However, it does not appear that the Jones decision would compel a different result than
that reached by the Seventh Circuit in French. See also Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223,
230 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979). In Buise, the court found a first
amendment right of association in a jailhouse lawyer who was transferred to another
prison due to his "writ writing" activities. Absent the correctional necessity outlined in
Jones, the transferred inmate's rights would be deemed violated. Id. at 230-31.
90. 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979).
91. Id. at 411-12. The court of appeals in Pittman employed the Supreme Court's
analysis in Jones, and distinguished Martinez on the grounds that the latter decision involved only censorship of personal mail. Id at 410-11. The court decided that since
distribution of the magazine involved mass mailing, the solicitation aspect of Jones would
be controlling. Id.
92. 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931 (1977).
93. Id. at 761.
94. Id. at 763. The pro se complaint was dismissed without a hearing or response by
prison administrators. The Court in Carpenter relied on Pell and Martinez as permitting
censorship in furtherance of the prison's interest in maintaining security, order, or
rehabilitation. Id. at 761-62. Cf. Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1977) (found
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In the fifth amendment procedural due process area, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hayes v. Walker 5 considered a prison
disciplinary proceeding. The court found that the minimum requirements of Wolff were not met in regard to the denial of witnesses
and a statement of reasons for disciplinary action." According to the
court in Hayes, reasons for denial of the limited right to call witnesses
is not mandated by Wolff, but some recorded basis is necessary to ensure that the decision was not arbitrary.9 7 Likewise, this reasoning requires an adequate statement as to evidence relied upon to support the
action taken by the disciplinary board."
However, according to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
Marchesaniv. McCune, 99 classification as a "special offender" without a
hearing was not beyond the wide latitude of officials absent a clear
abuse of discretion."' Similarly, another panel of the same court, in
Twyman v. Crisp,"' determined that reclassification of an inmate from
medium to maximum custody was "completely within the sphere of
authority" of officials. A contrary result was reached by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Buise v. Hudkins," a case which involved a transfer between prisons. Despite the Supreme Court's
holdings in Meachum and Montayne,"' the Buise court found that a
transfer was not permitted in retribution
for the exercise of protected
04
rights, such as that of a "writ writer."'
Buise also involved a separate consideration of access to the courts
from the perspective of other inmates. The transfer of the prison's
"jailhouse lawyer" deprived the other inmates of their access to the
courts, as no law library was available, nor was there other adequate
"bare assertions" of prison officials insufficient, and required specific evidence in order to
justify the regulation banning communications between inmates). But see Main Road v.
Aytch, 565 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 1977) (placed burden on inmates challenging a regulation
which banned group press conferences to show that the prohibition is not legitimately
related to prison security).
95. 555 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977).
96. Id. at 630-31. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
97. 555 F.2d at 629-30. Accord, Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, (1st Cir. 1979).
98. 555 F.2d at 631, 633.
99. 531 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976).
100. Id. at 461-63. "Special Offender" status is a classification of inmates who require
greater management than others, and the duty to classify rests with prison officials. Id. at
461. However, such a classification may result in delays in job assignments, transfers,
furloughs, or early parole. Id.at 460. But see Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
101. 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978). But see Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 585
(4th Cir. 1976) (informal hearing procedure for assignment to maximum security was held
to violate the due process requirements of Wolff).
102. 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979).
103. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
104. 584 F.2d at 229.
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legal assistance. 5 Futher, a ban similar to that reviewed in Rudolph v.
Locke,' 6 which prohibited communication between inmates confined in
segregation, was also viewed by the Buise court as an impermissible
impairment of access to courts.' 7 In the absence of reasonable alternatives to ensure the meaningful access required by Bounds,0 0 the
court noted that inmates in segregation may need assistance of other
inmates to prepare legal papers. Thus, a regulation prohibiting inmate
communication may impair effective access.'0 9 However, restricted access to the prison law library in Twyman v. Crisp was not viewed as a
denial of access rights."0 The appellate court noted that the petitionerinmate's brief did not reveal that he was at all prejudiced by the
limitation, and held that availability of a library is only one factor to
be considered as bearing on access to the courts."' However, the court
did not enunciate the other factors which existed in the prison that ensured adequate legal assistance.
An eighth amendment challenge was considered by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Kirby v. Blackledge,"' where a "Chinese
cell" was compared to the "Black Hole of Calcutta.""' Conditions such
as this isolation cell, inadequate exercise, heating, and medical treatment were found sufficient to support a claim of cruel and usual
punishment."' Similarly, a claim which alleged failure to provide
reasonable protection from violent inmates and impermissible privations while in protective segregation constituted deliberate deprivation
of constitutional rights according to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Little v. Walker."' The treatment received while in
voluntary segregation, coupled with violent attacks and sexual assaults
by other inmates, was found to be manifestly "inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency" by the court."'
105. Id at 228.
106. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
107. 594 F.2d at 1078.
108. See notes 61 & 63 and accompanying text supra.
109. 594 F.2d at 1078.
110. 584 F.2d at 357. See also note 101 and accompanying text supra.
111. 584 F.2d at 357.
112. 530 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1976).
113. Id at 586. This "strip" or cell contained no bedding, no light, and no toilet
facilities, with the exception of a hole in the floor. Id.
114. Id. at 587.
115. 552 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1977). See also
Woodhouse v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973) (violence and sexual attacks by inmates constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment").
116. 552 F.2d at 197. To avoid violence-prone and "gang-affiliated" inmates, several inmates were transferred to "Segregation- Safekeeping." However, no distinction between
disciplinary and protective segregatees was made by prison officials. Thus, protective
segregatees were denied sanitary conditions, adequate medical care and food, and recrea-
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Johnson v. Glick,"7
considered a claim by a pretrial detainee alleging an unprovoked attack by a prison guard." 8 The court in Johnson found that a spontaneous attack by a guard did not constitute "punishment" as applied
to a detainee or convicted inmate,"9 but that such undue force did
deprive the detainee of liberty without due process of law.' Although
acknowledging that the occasional use of intentional force may be
justified in the management of prisoners, the court stated that consideration must be given to the need for the force applied, the extent
of injury, and the reason behind the use of the force.2
Eighth amendment violations involving conditions of confinement
and denial of medical care were found by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in McCray v. Burrell,122 when an inmate was placed in a
mental observation cell. The inmate in McCray was placed in isolated
confinement without clothes or bedding after he was found to be mentally unstable, and a pyschologist or psychiatrist was not contacted for
two days. 3 The court found impermissible eighth amendment violations, even though the confinement did not result from punishment,
but was for mental observation. The court concluded that all confinement within prison is subject to the eighth amendment's restrictions,
whether punitive or not."
25
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Spain v. Procunier,'
tional and rehabilitative activities. Id. at 195. Further, gang rapes were inflicted, as well
as destruction of personal property by these gang-affiliated inmates. Administrators did
nothing to remedy the situation. ld. But see Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378 (10th Cir.
1975), where inmates who had escaped from custody were placed in solitary confinement
with two meals a day, one shower per week, no bedding, and a light in the cell twentyfour hours a day. Id. at 380. The court found that these conditions did not amount to cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. at 382.
117. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
118. Id. at 1029-30. The detainee, who allegedly failed to follow instructions, was
struck in the head by a prison guard, and then denied requested medical attention for
several hours after the incident. Id.
119. Id. at 1032. The court in Johnson defined punishment as that which is "deliberately administered for a penal or disciplinary purpose, with the apparent authorization of ...
prison officials." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1033.
122. 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S. 471 (1976).
123. Id at 365-67. The inmate was thus confined on two separate occasions. The bare
cell in which he was confined had no sink, and he was not permitted to bathe or use articles of personal hygiene. The toilet was a hole in the floor. Id. at 367. He was given a
mattress at night, which he tore open to sleep in, due to the cold. However, he was later
disciplined for destroying the mattress. Id. at 366.
124. Id. at 367.
125. 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378 (10th Cir.
1975), where conditions of confinement for disciplinary inmates were not found to be unconstitutional.
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assessed the eighth amendment as applied to inmates confined to adjustment centers for disciplinary reasons. In this context, the use of
tear gas was not found to be impermissible, but the court restricted
the use of mechanical restraints, such as neck chains, waist belts, and
leg manacles." 6 Further, outdoor exercise, although not a per se constitutional mandate, was found to be imperative "to the psychological
and physical well-being of inmates."'"
Adequacy of medical care was considered by the Courts of Appeals
for the Second and Fifth Circuits in Todaro v. Ward'28 and Newman v.
Alabama respectively." Both appellate courts found medical treatment
to be constitutionally infirm because of improper attention by medical
personnel, inexcusable delays in treatment, 30 unsanitary conditions,
and obsolete equipment. 3' As the court in Newman stated, "[w]hile it is
not our function to expect or demand alchemy of prison officials, it is
our role to ensure that the plight of inmates is not constitutionally forsaken."' 3 ' This pronouncement can be said to describe the general standard utilized by the lower federal courts in the area of prisoner rights.
It is apparent that although the courts are aware of the need to
preserve prisoners' constitutional rights, they do not intrude upon the
discretion of prison officials absent a clear necessity to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION

With the Supreme Court's rejection of the prior "hands-off" approach utilized in the federal system, the Court did not attempt to provide constitutional rights to inmates anywhere near equal to those
guaranteed to ordinary citizens; it was obvious that the Court
recognized a prisoner's retention of certain constitutional rights and
evidenced a willingness to interfere with prison authorities to
safeguard these rights in instances where discretion was abused or
power was excessively wielded by the officials.
In reality, then, the Supreme Court has not provided constitutional
"rights" to prisoners, but has instructed the federal courts to act as
126. 600 F.2d at 196-98. In regard to the use of tear gas, the court premised its conclusion on the quantity of the substance used. That is, potentially dangerous amounts are only justified in extreme circumstances, but use of limited quantities for control methods
does not violate "evolving standards of decency." Id. at 196. Further, all the mechanical
restraints mentioned were employed both inside and outside the prison. Id. at 196. The
court distinguished the restraints allowed on this basis. Id. at 197-98.
127. Id. at 199-200.
128. 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977).
129. 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
130. 565 F.2d at 50-52.
131. 503 F.2d at 1331-32.
132. Id. at 1333.
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overseers of conduct and actions within the prison. Such a "check"
mechanism is not unreasonable, but the Supreme Court is less than
honest when it refers to this policy as insuring to the prisoner the
"normal" or "fundamental" constitutional rights. The standard for
review employed by the Supreme Court merely outlines the level of
supervision through which the federal courts may interfere with a
state's administration of its prison system. Although these guidelines
are posed within a framework of constitutional concepts, in actuality,
the extent of protection they afford does not come close to the fundamental constitutional "guarantees" available to a free citizen.
Practically speaking, it is difficult to dispute the decisions of the
Court, for it must be conceded that the stark realities of prison life do
justify the Court's balancing of interests, as well as the great weight
assigned to the maintenance of control within the interior of the
prisons of this country. Yet, from a theoretical, "constitutional right"
viewpoint, it is difficult to accept the pronouncements of the Court in
the prison context. However justifiable the Court's reasoning may be,
the Constitution itself does not provide the Court with any authority
to extinguish, or even to diminish, the rights of the prisoner. Although
the fifth amendment does enable the Court to deprive an individual of
property, life, or liberty, provided that due process guarantees have
been met, the Constitution itself is devoid of any provision which
specifically permits the total or partial deprivation of the prisoner's
other rights. Moreover, constitutional authority for distinguishing between the free citizen and the inmate cannot be inferred from the
traditional common-law belief that prisoners were "slaves of the
state." Absent true authority, the distinctions articulated by the Court
must be carefully scrutinized to assure that the deprivations effected
are necessary.
However, in approaching the problem, the Supreme Court has applied a balance of interest analysis, which, at least in the areas of first,
fifth, and eighth amendment rights, seems to be weighted heavily on
the side of penological interests. In this regard, it appears that
deference to prison authorities without true necessity has become a
stance which is more often exhibited in the Court's attitude. Such a
position does not comport with our society's general concepts of constitutional justice and fairness. Proper balance will be maintained only
if the deference afforded prison authorities is premised upon a true
showing of need. This delicate situation warrants close monitoring by
the federal courts to prevent prison administrators from misusing the
wide latitude and discretion they yet retain, and from arbitrarily
depriving inmates of their constitutional rights.
The limitations imposed by the Supreme Court on the constitutional
rights of prisoners do, however, appear to be a workable framework
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within which the federal courts may proceed. The balancing of governmental interests and those of individual prisoners should sufficiently
permit a lower court to assess the merits of the challenged claim, and
to reach a result which is warranted by a particular situation.
Therefore, regardless of the sentiment that the Supreme Court has
severely restricted the ability of an inmate to assert his constitutional
rights, the lower courts can still largely exercise their "supervisory"
powers with care and concern for the plight of the imprisoned individual.
Judith Ann Mackarey

